Women have made significant inroads into management in recent decades, yet they remain underrepresented in leadership positions in large firms. I assess the critical but little analyzed role that widespread corporate restructuring and gender equity considerations plays in this context. Drawing on gender equity and organizational change research, I build on social cognitive research and the opportunity structure for discrimination framework to develop contrasting predictions of corporate restructuring on sex differences in managerial promotion. I test these predictions using a unique data set comprising over twenty-five years of personnel records from a Fortune 500 manufacturing firm that restructured multiple times. Evidence is largely consistent with the opportunity structure for discrimination framework, and suggests that the firm responded to gender equity pressures to promote women. Women's promotion rates were higher than men's rates during restructuring relative to previous years, with the difference growing larger in higher job levels. However, few women transitioned into upper management positions in the firm because (1) restructuring slowed promotion rates for all managers, (2) women were placed into lower job levels than were men, and (3) women's promotion advantages were often short-lived. Implications of taking an historical approach to assess effects of organizational dynamics on gender inequality are discussed. Given historical promotion patterns, the lack of women in leadership roles in contemporary firms is surprising, especially in light of considerable gender equity pressures in recent decades (cf. Shaw, Champlin, Hartmann and Spalter-Roth 1993) . I argue that a critical yet little explored reason for women's slow advancement into senior management is the widespread and ongoing corporate restructuring process that began in the early 1980s (cf. Cappelli, Bassi, Katz, Knoke, Osterman, and Useem 1997). I maintain that restructuring-in the form of large-scale reductions in force (RIF) and reorganization of organizational systems-influenced women's progress in two main ways. First, restructuring slowed upward mobility rates for all managers as RIF ended the growth process on which promotions in large bureaucratic firms depended (Stewman 1988) , and as reorganizing firms reduced the use of promotions by expanding their use of bonus based rewards (Baker 1990) . 1 Since 1 Restructuring (also referred to as downsizing), may increase promotion rates if layoffs occur disproportionately in lower job levels of a pyramidal shaped organization as there will be fewer managers competing for the same positions at the top. I thank an anonymous reviewer for this comment. Although to my knowledge there is no empirical evidence on effects of restructuring on promotion, consistent with observed layoff patterns (e.g., with middle managers bearing the brunt of layoff), I assume that restructuring had a negative effect on promotion.
Women comprise half of the managerial workforce (Bureau of Labor Statistics 2005), yet hold only 15 percent of leadership positions in contemporary Fortune 500 firms (Catalyst 2006) . The lack of women in senior management reflects in part sex differences in hiring (cf. Castilla 2005; Fernandez, Castilla, and Moore 2000; Gorman 2005) , with women having a longer career path to the top than men. These patterns may also trace to women's lower promotion rates (Lazear and Rosen 1990) , although evidence in this regard is mixed and incomplete. Although scholars uncovered significant effects of sex bias on promotions in the 1960s and early 1970s (cf. Rosenbaum 1985) , others found that women were promoted at a higher rate than men in the 1970s and early 1980s, particularly in upper-level jobs (Petersen and Saporta 2004; Spilerman and Petersen 1999) . Moreover, few if any studies have explored longitudinal patterns of sex differences in promotion in firms in recent decades.
Given historical promotion patterns, the lack of women in leadership roles in contemporary firms is surprising, especially in light of considerable gender equity pressures in recent decades (cf. Shaw, Champlin, Hartmann and Spalter-Roth 1993) . I argue that a critical yet little explored reason for women's slow advancement into senior management is the widespread and ongoing corporate restructuring process that began in the early 1980s (cf. Cappelli, Bassi, Katz, Knoke, Osterman, and Useem 1997) . I maintain that restructuring-in the form of large-scale reductions in force (RIF) and reorganization of organizational systems-influenced women's progress in two main ways. First, restructuring slowed upward mobility rates for all managers as RIF ended the growth process on which promotions in large bureaucratic firms depended (Stewman 1988) , and as reorganizing firms reduced the use of promotions by expanding their use of bonus based rewards (Baker 1990 ). 1 Since 1 Restructuring (also referred to as downsizing), may increase promotion rates if layoffs occur disproportionately in lower job levels of a pyramidal shaped organization as there will be fewer managers competing for the same positions at the top. I thank an anonymous reviewer for this comment. Although to my knowledge there is no empirical evidence on effects of restructuring on promotion, consistent with observed layoff patterns (e.g., with middle managers bearing the brunt of layoff), I assume that restructuring had a negative effect on promotion. most large firms restructured multiple times in recent decades (cf. Cascio, Young, and Morris 1997), women's upward progress should have slowed substantially. Second, restructuring influenced careers of men and women differently, although the direction of this effect is uncertain in no small part due to a lack of theoretical predictions in this regard . Moreover, the perceptions of the relation between organizational change and gender equity are sharply divided (McCall 2005) : some scholars maintain that organizational change subordinated gender equity issues as firms focused primarily on managing change, whereas other scholars believe that organizational change enhanced women's careers as it provided firms with opportunities to integrate gender equity policies.
In effect, research on the effect of restructuring on gender equity often views the same change process in different ways, leaving open the question of whether restructuring was gender neutral or not. Those arguing that restructuring increased discrimination against women claim that RIF eliminated the middle management pathways into senior management-thereby trapping women in lower level jobs in which they were located (Acker 1992; Reskin and Padavic 1994) . Moreover, they argue that restructuring increased the likelihood that bias entered into career decisions because it (1) increased competition for promotions, thereby magnifying pressures on managers to act on cognitive biases; (2) increased flexibility of employment systems, thereby reducing protection against bias; and (3) increased empowerment of managers, thereby escalating managers' reliance on stereotypes in decision making (cf. Reskin 2000; Bielby 2000) . By contrast, organizational change may have enhanced firm's abilities to incorporate gender equity considerations. For instance, RIF increased job vacancies in senior management through early retirement policies-thereby allowing firms to promote a larger relative percentage of women than men. In addition, corporate reorganization removed prior constraints on upward mobility by replacing time in grade promotion criteria with performance based ones. Due to strong pressures for gender equity, and a commitment of firms and human resource managers to restrict discrimination against women and foster their movement into senior management (cf. Petersen and Saporta 2004; Spilerman and Petersen 1999) , firms may have taken advantage of opportunities created by restructuring to increase women's promotion rates relative to men's, even as overall rates of upward mobility declined considerably.
In this article, I assess effects of organizational change on gender equity. I do so by building on social cognitive research (cf. Bielby 2000; Reskin 2003 ) and the opportunity structure for discrimination framework (Petersen and Saporta 2004) , to develop contrasting accounts of the effect of corporate restructuring on sex differences in managerial promotion. Because these contrasting accounts do not explicitly address effects of corporate restructuring on sex differences in promotion, I
derive predictions based on assumptions of leading scholars in these traditions. 2 Social-cognitive researchers note that although organizations can limit cognitive bias, as shown in lab settings, bias is much more likely in the workplace (cf. Reskin 2000; Bielby 2000) , and higher still in restructuring firms. By contrast, the opportunity structure for discrimination framework argues that discrimination is limited by legal rules and human resource management oversight in restructuring firms, which are common in large firms that restructured.
I analyze the contrasting predictions from the two accounts using a unique data set comprising twenty five years of personnel records for managers in a large U.S. manufacturing firm. Like other Fortune 500 firms, the firm engaged in multiple restructurings (cf. Cascio, Young and Morris 1997), implementing an incentive pay system and a large-scale RIF in the mid 1980s, transforming its performance management system in the late 1980s, and implementing a second large-scale RIF in the 2 Both accounts assume that firms discriminate against women, and that organizational factors influence whether ascribed characteristics influence career decisions. Also, both seek to move research beyond an assessment of the motivations for discrimination (i.e., why firms and individuals discriminate) to focus on understanding how firms discriminate (Reskin 2003) and where in employment relationships bias is most likely (Petersen and Saporta 2004). early 1990s. After presenting and discussing my findings, I explore benefits of taking an historical approach to study effects of organizational dynamics on gender inequality.
SOCIAL-COGNITIVE RESEARCH
Social cognitive research argues that individuals automatically (unconsciously) characterize others into in-groups and out-groups, leading to distortion in information processing and decision making (cf. Bielby 2000 , Reskin 2000 . As such, workers' risk is "greater than suggested by conventional approaches to discrimination, which fail to recognize discrimination that originates in the nonconscious automatic cognitive processes to which all individuals are subject" (Reskin 2002: 219) For instance, cognitive biases can lead to a cumulative disadvantage for women as barriers to upward mobility become stronger in increasing hierarchical job levels (cf. Valian 1998), although such biases are limited by formalized personnel systems, managerial accountability, and transparency of managerial decisions (Reskin 2000 (Reskin , 2003 .
An important element of social cognitive research is that variability in "personnel practices and work arrangements plays a nontrivial role in workers' exposure to discrimination" (Reskin 2002: 219)-as shown in research on employing organizations (Reskin and McBrier 2000) and in lab experiments (see Reskin 2000 for a review). As yet, research has not considered effects of temporal variability in personnel practices in the same firm on cognitive bias. Given the considerably changes in organization in recent decades, assessing dynamics of organizational systems within firms should provide important evidence on the validity of social cognitive accounts. In particular, if assumptions of social cognitive scholars hold, we would expect that corporate restructuring will reduce women's rates of promotion relative to men as it removes limits on bias by magnifying the intensity of competitions for promotions, empowering managers, and increasing labor market flexibility.
Increased competition for promotions enhances the likelihood that managers favor same-sex colleagues in career decisions (e.g., by placing women behind men in labor queues for desirable jobs (Reskin and Roos 1990) ). Corporate restructuring should thus have a negative effect on women's mobility, as it reduced rates of promotion-and increased competition for promotions-in three related ways. First, by reducing employment, RIF reduced promotion rates, as organizational demography indicates (cf. Stewman 1988) . Second, by increasing firms' reliance on market forces to govern employment relationships (cf. Sørensen 1994), RIF allowed firms to reduce promotion rates as resulting at-will employment contracts increased survivors' fears of future dismissal (Jensen and Murphy 1990; Katz 1986) . Third, by installing incentive pay schemes, firms could reduce their reliance on promotion based rewards (Baker 1990 ).
Because restructuring also increased the workload and stress of managers in restructuring firms (cf. Shaw et al. 1993) , we would also expect that the incidence of social cognitive bias on work decisions would increase. As Reskin (2000) notes, Tetlock and Lerner (1999) find that the benefits of accountability diminish under time pressure, and Bodenhausen, Macrae, and Garst (1998) find that information overload and time pressures increase the influence of stereotypes on judgment. In short, as RIF increased competition among surviving managers for a declining number of jobs, and increased work load and stress, bias in promotion decisions also increased.
Social cognitive research also suggests that the transformation of performance management systems will increase the incidence of cognitive bias in the workplace as it subordinates gender equity considerations. As part of the performance management transformation process, firms restricted the use of objective measures influencing promotion such as seniority in a job, replacing them with more subjective performance appraisals. In doing so, they empowered managers considerably, with surveys indicating that managers in reorganized firms reported a lack of close supervision yet substantial control over how they accomplished their work (Osterman 1994) . Limits on cognitive bias in decision making should therefore be lower in restructured firms, increasing the likelihood that managers act on stereotypes in promotion decisions. As Nelson and Bridges (1999) document, decentralization of decision making authority in Sears in the 1970s increased the likelihood that women were discriminated against in pay decisions.
Finally, social cognitive research suggests that restructuring occurred in an environment where legal protection for women against discrimination was declining, thus increasing the likelihood that cognitive bias would shape career outcomes. For instance, federal courts limited plaintiff's abilities to win disparate-impact lawsuits (Reskin 2003) . In addition, throughout the 1990s, federal courts found few violators of the 1991 amendment to Title VII of the Civil Rights Act explicitly banning disparate-impact discrimination. Moreover, until 1992, private attorneys had few incentives to accept discrimination cases due to the difficulties in winning these suits. As such, pressures on personnel managers to limit bias may have declined considerably, resulting in lower rates of promotion for women relative to men.
THE OPPORTUNITY STRUCTURE FOR DISCRIMINATION
The opportunity structure for discrimination (OSFD) framework claims that three critical factors influence the presence or absence of discrimination against women: (1) the ease with which information on career decisions can be obtained; (2) the ambiguity of the assembled information; and (3) the availability of a plaintiff (Petersen and Saporta 2004) . It also posits that firms seek to treat all employees equally once they are in the organizational "system," due to internal oversight from personnel and legal departments and to external pressures from governmental legislation and regulatory bodies such as the EEOC (Petersen and Saporta 2004) . For example, Spilerman and Petersen (1999: 224) note that managers in the insurance company they studied claimed that pressures for affirmative action were strong in the period they studied, and "had motivated corporate programs to increase the representation of women in policy-making positions." In addition, Petersen and Saporta (2004) note that a manager in the firm they study maintained that the firm they had a strong commitment to gender equity, as did other large firms in the time period.
The OSFD framework predicts that discrimination against women decreases over time as managers move up the corporate ladder, and as information on past promotion decisions increases.
Although the promotion decision involves some subjectivity-and potential disagreement among assessors-the relative qualifications of employees who are promoted and who are passed over for promotion can be documented in an unambiguous fashion (Petersen and Saporta 2004: 861) . Moreover, employees passed over for promotion represent a sizable pool of potential plaintiffs.
There is a fair amount of evidence consistent with the OSFD framework. For instance, DiPrete (1989) analyzed data on employees in the federal civil service in the mid 1970s and found that although women were promoted at a lower rate than men in entry levels, in higher levels women had a net promotion advantage. These patterns were similar to those in Petersen and Saporta's (2004) analysis of a large production and service firm for the period 1978 to 1986, and in Spilerman and Petersen's (1999) study of a large insurance firm for the period 1971 to 1978.
There is also a fair amount of evidence suggesting that restructuring enhanced firms' abilities to enhance gender equity in career outcomes. For instance, pressures for gender equity were strong in recent decades, particularly with respect to desires to eradicate glass ceiling effects (cf. Shaw et al. 1993 ). In addition, increased competition in product markets reduces firm's abilities to discriminate against women (cf. Black and Brainerd 2004) , suggesting that discrimination is less likely in restructuring firms, particularly in large firms which have substantial personnel and legal staff tasked that can limit discrimination (cf. Kalev, Dobbin, and Kelly 2006) . As a result, during restructuring, women should experience a net promotion advantage that is increasing in increasing job level, albeit with overall rates of mobility reduced during restructuring relative to prior periods.
Research also suggests that organizational changes enhanced firms' abilities to promote women at a higher rate than similarly situated men. For instance, RIF created opportunities for firms to promote women into senior management, as many upper level managers accepted early retirement buyouts. In addition, changes in performance management systems eliminated factors limiting women's upward mobility, such as the seniority in a job requirement for promotion. Moreover, changes in performance management often increased managerial accountability, thereby restricting potential bias. That is, in transformed performance management systems, managers were often evaluated on their ability to conduct effective performance reviews, suggesting that some degree of control over pay decisions was retained by firms. In other words, organizational changes occurring during restructuring may have increased firms' ability to monitor workplace decisions, even as organizations became more "flexible" (cf. Rubery 2005) .
SUMMARY
Social cognitive research suggests that corporate restructuring created an environment conducive to sex discrimination, as increased competition for promotion exacerbated pressures for managers to favor in-group members in promotion decisions, and as increased labor market flexibility and empowerment allowed decision-makers to rely on their subjective assessment of performance. Given reduced enforcement of anti-discrimination legislation in the 1980s and 1990s, corporate restructuring should therefore reduce promotion rates for women considerably more than for similarly situated men.
By contrast, the OSFD framework argues that the factors influencing sex differences in promotion were largely unchanged during the corporate restructuring period, as oversight by legal and personnel staff continued to limit discrimination, and as discrimination remained illegal. Moreover, pressures for gender equity remained strong throughout the restructuring period, as concerns about women's under-representation in senior management drew interest from various societal actors. Thus, firms were able to take advantage of opportunities created by restructuring by promoting women into senior management positions at a more rapid rate than men.
METHODS
In order to assess the effect of corporate restructuring on sex differences in promotion, I analyze confidential longitudinal personnel files of a U.S. Fortune 500 energy sector firm for the period 1967 to 1993. 3 I also draw on information collected from internal corporate documents and semistructured interviews conducted with several of the firm's human resource managers. I examine data on external hires into the firm's salary grade level (SGL) system, which ranged from level 7 to level 24. The SGL system was common in large bureaucratic firms, consisting of interrelated jobs hierarchically ranked into grades to which salaries were attached.
Corporate Restructuring in the Firm
The restructuring process in the firm began in the mid 1980s with the implementation of an incentive pay system. This system rewarded managers with non-recurring bonuses (i.e., the bonuses did not result in an increase in a manager's base salary). Roughly 3.5% of managers received a bonus, with some temporal variation in that bonuses were most common in the first year of the incentive pay system, declining for several years, and then rising from the late 1980s onward. Women were roughly half as likely as men to receive a bonus. In addition, bonuses occurred in nearly every salary grade level, the exception being the lack of incentive pay in levels 20 and higher.
Subsequent to the implementation of the incentive system, the firm undertook two RIF. The first RIF occurred in the mid 1980s, and the second RIF occurred in the early 1990s. Internal documents obtained from the firm indicate that during the first RIF, layoffs were to be divisionally specific, with broad layoff guidelines delegated to each division and termination decisions made by senior managers within divisions. During the second RIF cutbacks were to be uniform across the firm, with strategic objectives for all divisions established by committees of senior managers and forwarded to business unit managers who implemented the layoffs.
In the interim between the RIF, the firm reorganized its performance management system on an organization-wide basis. Similar to other large firms, it sent senior managers to other firms to study performance management systems, and hired consultants to help design and implement the new system. As part of the transformation, the firm transitioned from a seniority-based appraisal and reward system to one in which the goal was to make pay contingent on a manager's performance relative to other similarly situated managers. In doing so, it sought to make performance objectives measurable, attainable, and relevant, and to ensure consistency across managers in promotion decisions. It required managers to negotiate performance expectations and goals with subordinates early in the performance cycle (year), and to provide feedback to subordinates in meetings throughout the cycle, ending with the communication of detailed information on performance ratings to the subordinates. In addition, it required supervisors managing similar groups of subordinates to systematically compare relative performance of their ratees.
Although written rules in the new performance management system may have reduced ambiguity of assembled information and increased accountability of raters relative to the old system, a few key aspects of the new system reduced transparency in decision making. As part of the change process, all performance evaluation records were eliminated. According to the firm, it sought to minimize potential bias in future performance rankings, in that prior performance would be less likely to be taken into account in measuring current performance-thereby removing the problems that arise from labeling employees, and allowing the firm to take a more careful and complete look at performance appraisal and relative performance every year. As noted by confidential internal documents obtained from the firm, in the new performance management system, "relative performance was not fixed, and an employee's relative position had to be 're-earned' each year."
Evidence from internal documents and other sources suggests that restructuring subsumed gender equity considerations to the change process. The firm replaced old bureaucratic features with new more flexible ones that empowered managers to make decisions, and increased the degree to which rewards depended on performance rather than seniority. In addition, according to managers in the firm, internal surveys suggested that restructuring increased the workload of surviving managers, and increased uncertainty and stress at least in the short run. Moreover, the firm was old and maledominated-being in existence for most of the 20 th Century-traits shown to increase the incidence of cognitive bias against women (cf. Baron, Mittman, and Newman 1991). Finally, the firm eliminated the recording of performance rankings, one of the key formalized human resource management practices providing protection against discrimination (cf. Kalleberg, Knoke, Marsden and Spaeth 1996; Reskin and McBrier 2000) . Thus, if corporate restructuring increased the incidence of cognitive bias in the workplace, as the social cognitive account suggests, it should show up in lower promotion rates for women relative to men during the firm's RIF and performance management transformation. Nevertheless, the firm preserved some control over promotion decisions in the new pay and performance management system, as managers were required to meet with subordinates multiple times in a year to discuss performance expectations and evaluations.
Data Set
The data I analyzed consisted of a 25% random sample of managers in SGL 7 to 24 who had entered the firm at any time from 1967 to 1993, resulting in a sample size of 5,675 managers. 4 I have incomplete information on managers who entered prior to 1967, in that, for example, career progression prior to 1967 is unobserved. Because including employees whose career information is incomplete can lead to a survivorship bias (Petersen 1995) , I follow convention (cf. Petersen and Saporta 2004; Barnett, Baron, and Stuart 2000) and study promotions of managers whose careers could be traced from their initial entry in the firm. Results are generally robust to the inclusion of managers in the manner recommended by Guo (1993) .
Variables Table 1 provides operationalizations of the variables used in the analyses. The main dependent outcome is a promotion. According to human resource managers and the firm's internal documents, a promotion was coded in the data set-and was understood by managers-as involving an upward movement between salary grade levels. I use a number of time-varying variables to capture effects of corporate restructuring on gender differences in promotions. I created pre-restructuring and restructuring period measures, with the breakpoint tracing to the year that the firm implemented the incentive pay system, which occurred in the mid 1980s. Findings with respect to gender differences in promotion were largely robust to the selection of different adjacent starting points. I also measure effects of specific restructuring episodes with year dummies. I examine effects of incentive pay using a dichotomous measure of whether a manager received a bonus in a given year. Table 1 about here
I measure sex of the manager with a dummy variable, and consider promotions across SGL occupied using variables that capture the difference between promotion chances for managers in SGL 7 to 24. Due to a lack of women managers in a number of levels in a given year, and to similarities in promotion requirements among adjacent SGL, I grouped levels that were similar on many dimensions: entry level managers (levels 7 to 9); middle level managers (levels 10 to 12); upper middle level managers (levels 13 to 16); and upper level managers (levels 17 to 24).
I control for a number of demographic, organizational, and human capital variables common in studies of promotion in large firms. Petersen and Saporta (2004) included in their analyses measures that were relevant for determining discrimination in courts, namely job level occupied, time spent in a job level, age, education, occupation, tenure in the firm, year of hire, and job level at hire. I include these controls as well as variables measuring the manager's race, division occupied (cf.
Spilerman and Petersen 1999), year-end salary, and number of prior promotions received.
Method of Estimation
I use discrete-time event history methods (cf. Allison 1982) to analyze promotion. The risk set analyzed conforms to entry into the firm, with each manager's tenure split into yearly episodes, and with promotion a repeatable event. The discrete-time hazard rate is defined as P it = Pr [T i = t | T i >/= t, x it ], where T is the discrete random variable providing the uncensored time of event occurrence. This hazard rate is the conditional probability that a promotion occurred at time t, given that it had not yet occurred, and is estimated using maximum likelihood methods such as logit models (Allison 1982: 72) . I clustered observations by manager to calculate robust (Huber/White) standard errors. Table 2 provides descriptive statistics for managers at the time they were hired by the firm separated into different time periods. It shows that women entered managerial ranks at an increasing rate over time, particularly during the restructuring period of the mid 1980s to 1993. 5 Yet, sex differences in level of entry were constant from the late 1960s to the 1990s, with women entering the firm at roughly one level below men. Over time, it was increasingly likely for women to be hired into the main corporate office, and an even higher likelihood of being hired into the human resources function, with women comprising more than half of new entrants in this function during the late 1980s to early 1990s. In addition, women received lower starting salaries than men, with pay differences narrowing over time, particularly for entrants in levels 8 and 9. Table 2 also shows that age and educational qualifications varied over time, not only across sex groups, but within them. Also, men and women entrants were roughly 28 years of age in the late 1960s to the early 1970s, yet women were three years younger than men in the restructuring period.
RESULTS
5 A more detailed inspection of entry rates reveals that women's increased rates of hiring relative to men occurred in a short time frame: in the interim between the first RIF and the transformation in the performance management system, women went from 23 percent of new hires in one year to 39 percent of new hires in the following year, never dropping below 33 percent in the remaining sample period.
In addition, in the late 1960s to the early 1970s, roughly 15 percent of women had an advanced degree, compared to roughly 25 percent of men. In the mid 1970s to the early 1980s, educational qualifications increased for both groups, with 30 percent of women holding an advanced degree, and 37 percent of men holding an advanced degree. During the restructuring period, educational qualifications dropped for men and women. Table 3 provides findings from discrete-time event-history analyses of managerial promotion rates for the period 1967 to 1993. Results are similar to those found in Gerhart and Milkovich (1989) , Petersen and Saporta (2004) and Spilerman and Petersen (1999) . That is, in absence of control variables (Column 1), women were promoted at a significantly higher level than men. Introducing controls in Column 2, the sex promotion difference declines, but women still maintain a significant promotion advantage relative to men (exp(.07)=1.07). In addition, women's promotion advantage was higher in upper middle management (levels 13 to 16) and upper management (levels 17 to 24) than in entry job levels (Column 3)-consistent with the OSFD account.
Discrete-Time Event History Analyses of Sex Differences in Promotion Rates
Sex differences in promotion were largely unchanged when the year dummies were replaced with the restructuring period measure (Column 4), and with the introduction of the incentive pay variable (Column 5). Moreover, all organizational change measures (RIF, the restructuring dummy, and the incentive pay measure) show that corporate restructuring had a strong negative effect on promotion likelihood. For example, Column 5 shows that managers who received a bonus in a given year had a significantly lower rate of promotion than did managers who did not receive a bonus, and that rates of promotion during the restructuring period were 41% lower than they were in non- Table 3 about here Table 4 provides evidence on sex differences in promotion during the restructuring period relative to prior years (Columns 1 and 2), and in specific years of the restructuring period (Columns 3 and 4). Column 1 reveals that women were less likely to be promoted during the restructuring period than were men, although the difference was not significant, and results in Column 2 show that women who received a bonus were substantially more likely to be promoted than men who received a bonus.
Findings in Column 3 indicate that there was some variation in sex differences in promotion across time during the restructuring period. In the period in which the new incentive pay system was implemented (the omitted reference year), women were significantly less likely to be promoted than were men (as indicated by the coefficient on the female measure). However, in the other restructuring years, women were more likely to be promoted than men, with their net advantage highest in the year following the implementation of the new performance management system in the firm. Table 4 about here Table 5 extends the analyses to examine sex differences in promotion across SGL groups separately for 12 different periods. Columns 1 and 2 analyze promotion differences in the prerestructuring and restructuring periods, and Columns 3 to 12 analyze promotion differences in selected years of the restructuring period. Column 1 shows little evidence of sex differences in promotion in the pre-restructuring period. Column 2 shows, however, that women's promotion advantage grew significantly larger in increasing job levels during the restructuring period. Table 5 about here
Columns 3-12 show considerable variation in sex differences in promotion over time during the restructuring period. Column 3 of Table 5 indicates that in the year in which the firm implemented its incentive pay system, women managers in entry level jobs experienced a lower rate of promotion than men, yet a higher but insignificant rate of promotion in the other job levels.
However, women's lower rate of promotion in entry levels was short lived, occurring only in this year of the restructuring period. For instance, in the year following the implementation of the incentive pay system (Column 4) and in the year of the first RIF (Column 5), women's mobility rates were not significantly different from mobility rates of similarly situated men.
Columns 6 and 7 show variation in women's promotion advantage during the first RIF. In the year following the first RIF, women in SGL 13 to 16 (the highest levels occupied by women in that year) were much more likely to be promoted than men (exp(.05+1.36)=3.90) (Column 6), although this net promotion advantage disappeared in the following year (Column 7). Similar patterns are evident during the transformation in the firm's performance management system. 6 During the year in which the new system was implemented, women in all SGL groups were promoted at roughly the same rate that men were (Column 8). However, the change to the performance management system subsequently increased promotion rates of women relative to men. In particular, women in entry level jobs were significantly more likely to be promoted than similarly situated men (exp(.61)=1.84), women in middle management levels (10 to 12) were less likely to be promoted than men, and women in upper middle management levels (13 to 16) were somewhat more likely to be promoted than men (Column 9). Nevertheless, women's promotion advantage in entry level jobs disappeared in the following year (Column 10) and did not reappear throughout the remainder of the sample period.
Results in Column 11 reveal that promotion rates of women in entry level jobs were lower than those of men during the second RIF, with the difference declining in the following year (Column 12). Overall though, women's net promotion advantage was increasing in increasing job level during the second RIF: women in senior management were more likely to be promoted than were similarly situated men during the second RIF; and women in upper middle management jobs were more than three times as likely to be promoted in the year following the second RIF than were similarly situated men (exp(-.00+1.13)=3.10). 7 Moreover, women who received a bonus were much more likely to be promoted than men who received a bonus, with the difference significant in the year following the second RIF (Column 12).
Predicted Probabilities of Promotion in Historical Perspective
In order to show more clearly the variation in sex differences in promotion over time, I generated predicted probabilities of promotion in selected time periods, with results calculated from unreported analyses of promotion for each of these time periods, and with control variables set at their mean levels. Figure 1 provides predicted probabilities of promotion over the entire sample frame, divided into five year increments. Several historical patterns are notable. Similar to Rosenbaum (1985) , I find evidence of a glass ceiling for women in middle management levels in the late 1960s and early 1970s. In particular, women in SGL 10 to 12 (the highest levels that they occupied in this period), were only half as likely to be promoted as were similarly situated men. However, by the mid 1970s, women's net promotion disadvantage disappeared.
7 This large effect stems in part from the number of women in upper management levels during this period. Of the 17 person-periods involving women in senior management during corporate restructuring, 10 involved a promotion. As Petersen and Saporta (2004) note, it is sometimes difficult to estimate sex differences in promotion in senior management due to the few numbers of women in this group. Nevertheless, women in levels above SGL 12 experienced a net promotion of advantage that was fairly stable from the early 1980s onward. For instance, women in SGL 13 to 16 were nearly twice as likely to be promoted as were men in these levels, and women in SGL 17 to 24 were more than three times as likely to be promoted as were men.
---------------------------------------Insert Figures 1 and 2 about here ----------------------------------------
Figure 2 provides sex differences in predicted probabilities in promotion during the restructuring period for each of the four SGL groups. Results reveal substantial variation in promotion rates for entry level managers (SGL 7-9) and upper middle managers (SGL 13-16). For entry level managers, the variation in promotion rates over time was roughly the same for men and women, the main exception being women's net advantage in the year following the implementation of the new performance management system. For upper middle managers, sex differences in promotion were more striking. In particular, women in SGL 13-16 had considerably higher promotion rates than similarly situated men prior to the onset of restructuring, and in the year following each of the restructuring events in the firm. Table 6 provides descriptive evidence on women's representation in management in selected years. It shows that women's representation in upper management positions remained substantially below men's by the end of the sample period in 1993, with only one out of every ten managers above salary grade level 12 being a woman. Thus, although women were promoted at a more rapid rate than men in upper management over time, few women reached the top of the career ladder.
Distribution of Women across Organizational Structures over Time

----------------------------------
Insert Table 6 about here ----------------------------------Women's movement into senior management levels also slowed because women were hired into lower starting job levels than men. OLS regressions of job level at hire on sex (controlling for age, education, race, division, and job function) reveal that women started their careers at half of a grade level lower than did men (models not reported). Although this sex difference declined slightly to four-tenths of a grade level during the restructuring period relative to prior years (with the average starting level for all managers increased by two-tenths of a grade level during restructuring), the differential placement of men and women at hiring increased the length of time for many women to move into senior levels.
DISCUSSION
In this article, I built on social cognitive research and the opportunity structure for discrimination framework to develop predictions regarding the effect of corporate restructuring on sex differences in managerial promotions, drawing on gender equity and organizational change research to refine the two contrasting accounts. My findings were largely consistent with the OSFD framework-and with research showing that women's promotion was most likely in levels in which they were substantially under-represented (cf. Budig 2002; Cohen, Broschak and Haveman 1998 )-yet inconsistent with the social cognitive account presented in this article.
Women in the firm I studied made significant inroads into management during the corporate restructuring period as their net promotion advantage increased in increasing job level. These findings suggest that the firm took its stated goal of increasing women's representation in management seriously. Like other firms in the time frame, the firm acknowledged that women were under-represented in management, and made multiple public statements about the strategic need to address this problem throughout the years of the restructuring period.
Despite their gains, women also experienced a considerable decline in career progression as RIF and the transformation of the firm's performance management system reduced promotion rates for most managers. In addition, women continued to be placed into lower starting grade levels than men, and were predominantly hired into the human resource management function, thereby restricting their pathways into senior management. That is, even though women in the HR function had a similar net promotion advantage as women in other functions did (as confirmed by unreported analyses), and although the HR function did reach to the very top of the SGL ladder, that HR positions represented less than five percent of senior management positions considerably restricted women's ability to reach parity with men in leadership positions in the firm.
Another factor slowing women's progress into senior management was that their benefits from RIF and reorganization were short-lived. These patterns suggest that gender equity pressures are a necessary but not sufficient factor for explaining observed outcomes. 8 In particular, gender equity pressures alone cannot account for women's high rates of promotion for women in levels in which they were substantially underrepresented during years surrounding the specific restructuring events relative to adjacent years. For instance, Spilerman and Petersen (1999) argue that firms were able to respond to affirmative actions pressures and promote women into senior ranks at a higher rate than 8 The variable patterns of sex differences in promotion also cast some doubt on the validity of arguments that claim that women were substantially more able than similarly situated men (cf. Lazear and Rosen 1990) . In additionevidence from frailty tests conducted with random effects models suggests that unobserved ability was not a determining factor of the patterns of promotion uncovered in this article. men because there were few women senior managers. That is, "a policy of facilitating women's advancement could be pursued with little detrimental impact on the promotion opportunities of men and, therefore, with little employee opposition" (Spilerman and Petersen 1999: 224 ). Yet, if gender equity pressures and the lack of women in senior management held throughout the restructuring period, one would expect women's promotion advantage to be more uniform over time.
In short, explaining variation in sex differences in promotion during restructuring requires a consideration not only of gender equity concerns, but also of the organizational change process.
Moreover, these explanations need to account for historical differences in the factors influencing promotion. Prior to restructuring, firms often increased rates of promotion by creating jobs (cf. Baker 1990), making upward mobility less dependent on departures of incumbents from higher level jobs (White 1970) . In creating vacancies by creating jobs, firms may have enhanced their flexibility in addressing gender equity pressures. That is, firms could limit potential negative reactions from promoting women at relatively high rates simply by creating promotion opportunities for all managers. By contrast, the ability to create jobs during the period of restructuring was severely limited as firms were forced to deal with the challenges of motivating managers in a context of reduced promotion rates relative to prior periods. Thus, in restructuring firms, the ability to provide promotions depended critically on the vacancy creation process.
Given the uneven rates of vacancy creation across time during the restructuring period, one would expect that the ability of firms to promote women may also vary over time. Evidence from my study tends to support the notion that firms faced different challenges in addressing gender equity pressures in the restructuring period relative to previous periods. For instance, RIF arguably created opportunities to fill a number of job vacancies through layoffs and early retirement, which the firm did by promoting women at higher rates than men. These patterns were evidence for managers in SGL 13 to 16. That is, a tabulation of the data set reveals that vacancy creation rates-rates of departure of incumbents in the next highest level job due to retirement, resignation, layoff, or promotion-were 15.2 % in SGL 13 to 16 for the entire sample period, 21.7% in the year of the first RIF (declining to 10.2% in the following year), 17.9% in the year of the performance management change (declining to 13% in the following year), and 21.4% in the year of the second RIF (declining to 12.2% in the following year).
In terms of women's promotion advantage during the transformation in performance management system, gender equity considerations also likely played a role, albeit in a slightly different manner than during the RIF episodes. For instance, entry-level female managers' net promotion advantage during the transformation period may have been an unintended consequence of the firm's oversight of the performance management change process (i.e., the firm may have overcompensated in seeking to limit discrimination in the redesign of its performance management system). As Elvira (2001) notes, it is difficult to modify incentive systems in firms without incurring unintended gender related consequences. Evidence from internal documents tends to support this claim, indicating that the firm and the consultants it employed were aware of potential bias resulting from the transformation, with a number of features of the new performance management similar to ones seen as effective for limiting cognitive bias in lab settings (Reskin 2000 (Reskin , 2003 . In addition, the firm sought to ensure accountability of raters, not only by making their own pay dependent on their effectiveness in evaluating performance, but also by requiring them to communicate their ratings and feedback to subordinates. Perhaps as a result, women experienced a net promotion advantage in some job levels, with rates returning to previous levels soon thereafter.
Overall, my findings are largely inconsistent with predictions of social cognitive research presented in this article, despite consistencies between actions of the firm and those argued to increase cognitive bias in the workplace. Similar to other firms, the firm replaced objective promotion criteria with subjective ones as it deemphasized seniority based criteria in career decisions and increased emphasis on relative performance as measured by supervisors. It empowered managers by pushing decision making downward, at the same time that it reduced the number of job vacancies for managers in many levels of the firm. In addition, by eliminating records of performance ratings, the firm prevented plaintiffs from having access to critical information that could serve as a basis for lawsuits, and reduced transparency and accountability. Finally, restructuring occurred during a time arguably characterized by lax enforcement of anti-discrimination legislation (Reskin 2003) . As such, social cognitive research may need to assess more carefully how practices limiting bias in lab settings are translated to the workplace. For instance, it is important to consider that accountability and oversight may be much lower in experimental contexts than in organizations, and that it is not just the number and type of human resource practices in firms that influence bias, but also the commitment of firms to gender equity.
My study has a number of implications for research on gender inequality and career mobility.
It highlight the usefulness of taking an historical approach to the study of mobility, showing for instance that period effects were strong throughout the restructuring period. 9 In addition, the observed sex differences in promotion indicate that equitable treatment is not only a function of antidiscrimination legislation and EEOC enforcement, but also traces to other broad forces pushing for gender equity in the workplace. For instance, the firm took an active role throughout the restructuring period in promoting women into senior management, a time of considerable pressures for them to do 9 The "pipeline" problem and the firm's attempts to address it raise the possibility that cohort effects influenced mobility if the firm admitted large than normal cohorts of younger managers to fill the pipeline. I control for this possibility in the analyses by including year of hire and salary grade level at hire measures. Supplemental analyses suggest that period effects are robust. From the mid 1970s onward, sex differences in promotion were similar across cohort groups, with the separate RIF opening up jobs in similar fashion. I thank an anonymous reviewer for this comment. so. By contrast, even in a context where discrimination was illegal, namely in the late 1960s and early 1970s, women faced significant constraints on their ability to move up the corporate ladder. As such, these results suggest that the OSFD framework can be extended to consider when in historical time discrimination is more likely, and to consider more carefully the role that societal pressures play in this regard. Finally, the findings confirm that different forms of restructuring had a negative effect on promotion rates-which to my knowledge has not been demonstrated empirically. 10 Given the findings in this article, an important question is whether and how firms can increase the representation of women senior management levels. My findings are consistent with research suggesting that women's progress will be slow in coming years (cf. Catalyst 2006; Helfat, Harris, and Wolfson 2006) , highlighting effects of both reduced rates of mobility as firms continue to restructure, and the over-representation of women in the HR function. More generally, my study indicates that the ability of women to reach top levels of contemporary organizations depends on factors creating job vacancies in firms, on the effectiveness of policies limiting discrimination, on how human resource managers and legal staff manage external pressures for equitable treatment in the workplace, and on whether women are well situated for taking advantage of job openings. Moreover, the results suggest that transformations in performance management systems can reduce negative consequences stemming from previous promotion criteria. In particular, as Petersen and Saporta (2004) note, one of the challenges of filling the pipeline of women is women's relative lack of tenure. By making promotion less tied to tenure-and more tied to relative performance-restructuring may enhance firms' ability to fill the pipeline. 10 Elvira (2001) explored the link between bonus and promotion, showing that employees who were eligible for a bonus were also likely to be promoted-a finding somewhat at odds with agency theory accounts (cf. Baker 1990) . My findings show that firms likely did make a tradeoff between bonus and promotions, but that there are key historical and gender contingencies in this relationship.
Because the factors I identify are common across firms, my results should generalize to other contexts. For example, differences in upward mobility between men and women in the firm were similar to those found in other firms from the late 1960s to the early 1980s (cf. Barnett, Baron and Stuart 2000; DiPrete 1989; Petersen and Saporta 2004; Spilerman and Petersen 1999; Rosenbaum 1985) . In addition, like most large firms in the period, the firm I studied restructured multiple times (cf. Cascio, Young, and Morris 1997), and relied on external advice from consultants on the design and implementation of restructuring initiatives, as well as from senior managers sent to other firms to examine best practices for restructuring. Thus, my study provides some sense of where organizational and policy changes can influence women's career mobility, particularly as different forms of change transpire. For instance, the way in which firms manage the retirement of baby-boom generation managers will have a significant impact on women's representation in management.
CONCLUSION
My findings uncover that it is important to answer not just how firms discriminate (Reskin 2003) and where in the employment relationship gender discrimination occurs (Petersen and Saporta 2004) , but also when in historical time discrimination is likely. They echo those of Petersen and Saporta (2004) as they indicate that allocative discrimination is restricted in large contemporary organizations: once hired, there are strong pressures on firms to ensure that men and women are treated equally. Yet, they also show the historically contingent nature of sex differences in promotion, as women experienced bias in the firm in the late 1960s and early 1970s-despite legislation against discrimination-and as the firm promoted women at a high rate throughout the restructuring period, due presumably to pressures to increase women's representation in management. Thus, future research on gender inequality in organizations should examine in more detail the effect of different dynamic factors on career outcomes (Wharton 2003) , such as the influence of corporate restructuring on increasing stratification within gender groups (cf. McCall 2001) , and whether restructured firms have similar barriers to women's career mobility that other organizational forms do (Smith-Doerr 2004) .
In sum, my study makes a number of significant contributions to research on gender inequality in organizations, and to studies of career mobility. My findings extend research on sex differences in promotion to cover a longer time frame and to include an important yet little understood context to show that corporate restructuring (at least temporarily) enhanced career opportunities of women by creating vacancies in upper level jobs that otherwise would have been closed. My findings also highlight that although change in the form of restructuring does reduce promotion rates for most managers, the demographic and market forces driving these outcomes are insufficient for understanding fully sex differences in career outcomes. In particular, my results support McCall's (2005) claim that understanding gender inequity in contemporary organizations requires an understanding of both organizational change and gender equity notions. Consistent with this idea, when considered in historical context, the findings suggest that the firm was playing "catch-up" to overcome its previous exclusion of women in management, particularly in terms of advancing women into leadership positions. Yet, this process proceeded in fits and starts, with substantial temporal variation in women's upward career mobility. Coded 1 for the year in which the firm reorganized its performance management system and 0 otherwise Salary Grade Level Categories Entry levels (7, 8, and 9) , middle management levels (10, 11, and 12), upper middle management levels (13, 14, 15, and 16) , and upper management levels (17 to 24). Incentive Pay Coded 1 if a manager received a bonus in a given year, and 0 otherwise.
Control Variables
Duration Variables Note: Discussions with managers and an inspection of the data set helped me to create the salary grade level groupings. Results were robust to an analysis of sex differences in promotion across all grade levels. Information on occupations was available only from several thousand unique job titles. I enlisted HR managers and scholars to group these titles into those belonging to the HR function versus those that belonged to other functions. Responses were very consistent across rankers. is Salary Grade Levels 7 to 9. Controls for period effects are included in Columns 2 and 3. Results are only reported for the years of the two RIF, with the omitted year being 1980, the year in which promotion rates were closest to the average over all time periods. †p<.10; *p<.05; **p<.01; ***p<.001 (two tailed test). Table 3 , and Columns 3 and 4 includes the same set of controls as Column 2 of Table 3 . The year in which the firm implemented the incentive pay program is the omitted category in Columns 3 and 4 (the coefficient for the Female variable thus captures the difference between men and women during this year). Coefficients for control variables are not included in the Table. †p<.10; *p<.05; **p<.01; ***p<.001 (two tailed test). 1967 -1973 1974 -1978 1979 -1983 1984 -1988 1989 -1993 Note: Predicted probabilities of promotion were calculated using the statistical program Clarify (Tomz, Wittenberg, and King 2003) . Probabilities were calculated from models similar to those in Table 5 (i.e., with a separate analysis for each time period in the Figure, and with the same set of controls as the models in Table 5 ), with control variables set at mean levels. Note: Predicted probabilities of promotion were calculated using the statistical program Clarify (Tomz et al 2003) , calculated from models similar to those in Table 5 (i.e., with a separate analysis for each time period in the Figure, and with the same set of control variables), with control variables set at mean levels. Acronyms used are IP (Incentive Pay Implementation), RIF (Reduction in Force), and PMC (Performance Management Change Implementation). All years of the restructuring period are included in the models, beginning with the year prior to the implementation of the Incentive Pay System.
